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ABSTRACT 
 
Under SFAS No. 131, a company is required to provide a reconciliation of the total of the 
reportable segments’ profit or loss to the firm’s consolidated income. This paper investigates 
these segment disclosures and related determinants of managers’ segment financial reporting 
choices. We focus on managers’ decisions to report segment-to-firm level reconciliations (i.e., 
segment reconciliations (SERs)) – differences between firm-level and aggregated segment-level 
earnings. On average, we find that SERs are significant when the differences are not equal to 
zero. Firms with higher agency costs and greater accruals are less likely to report segment 
reconciliations. However, firms that have a greater number of segments, larger firms, and firms 
with higher leverage, losses, and greater earnings volatility are more likely to report SER≠0. 
Consistent with managers having some segment reporting discretion, our overall findings suggest 
a manager’s segment reporting choice is partly driven by agency costs. Interestingly, among firms 
with reported segment reconciliations, firms with higher agency costs are more likely to report 
positive SERs. Consequently, this study documents a relation between proxies for agency costs 
and managers’ decisions to report segment reconciliations. Policy implications and suggestions 
for future research are discussed in the paper. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
he Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) adopted a number of fundamental changes to its 
standards for segment reporting by adopting Statement of Financial Accounting Standard No. 131 
(SFAS No. 131) – Disclosures about Segments of an Enterprise and Related Information, in June 
1997, which superseded SFAS No. 14. SFAS No. 131 established standards for reporting information about 
“operating segments” of an enterprise rather than following the “industry segment” standards under the previous 
segment reporting regime. The measure of segment profit or loss and segment total assets under SFAS No. 131 is 
the measure reported to the chief operating decision maker for purposes of making decisions about allocating 
resources to the segment and assessing its performance.
1
 Therefore, a company may determine segment earnings on 
a basis that differs from consolidated operating earnings as defined by Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP) or excludes the effects of items attributable to that segment. In this situation, SFAS No. 131 requires that a 
footnote to the company’s consolidated financial statements provide a segment reconciliation (SER) between what is 
reported at the aggregated segment level and what is reported at the consolidated firm level. For the purpose of this 
study, we focus on aggregated segment earnings and consolidated earnings reported in the firm’s annual financial 
                                                 
1 For the purpose of this study we only focus on segment profit/loss rather than revenues or total assets. We provide some 
discussion about this focus in the paper. 
T 
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This paper examines these segment reconciliations by: (1) determining whether these segment 
reconciliations are significant in magnitude; (2) examining whether they have value relevance; and (3) examining 
the determinants of managers’ decisions to report differences between what is reported at the aggregated segment 
level and the consolidated firm level, which then require segment reconciliations. Our findings show that segment 
reconciliations are significantly value relevant, which suggests that these reconciliations should be of concern to 
investors, managers, auditors, and regulators alike. 
 
Segment information can be difficult for outsiders to observe and monitor because of the uneven 
compliance among reporting companies under SFAS No. 131 (Paul & Largay, 2005). The wider discretion allotted 
in SFAS No. 131 has led to concerns that regulators have opened the floodgates for accounting manipulation 
(Reason 2001). Some studies have concluded that giving management discretion within GAAP deteriorates earnings 
quality and predictability (Dechow et al., 2010; Matsumoto, 2002). Enron (although an extreme case and not the 
focus of this study) is an example of a firm whose management used its discretion to manipulate segment earnings.
3
 
However, other studies have concluded that giving management discretion under GAAP improves earnings 
predictability (Elliott & Philbrick, 1990; Ewert & Wagenhofer, 2005). Because of this discretion in reporting 
segment earnings, it is critical that the reconciliation provide the necessary information for investors to reconcile 
“management approach” derived earnings with total aggregated earnings reported using GAAP measures. 
 
Earlier studies have focused on how managers internally operate the firm’s segments by examining how 
managers allocate capital across and between segments. For example, prior literature has shown that agency 
problems exist in firms when internal capital markets are inefficient and when the firm engages in subsidizing 
poorly performing segments with funds from better performing segments (Stulz, 1990; Lamont, 1997; Shin & Stulz, 
1998). Berger and Hann (2007) find that in the pre SFAS No. 131 period, managers were not disclosing segments 
with low abnormal profits in firms with high agency costs. Therefore, the extent of agency costs in the firm should 
play an important role in a manager’s segment disclosure choice in order to hide unprofitable segments or the cross-
subsidization of unprofitable segments, especially when firms are choosing not to disclose SERs, by reporting 
aggregated segment profits equal to firm-level profits. On the other hand, managers can face proprietary costs of 
segment disclosure if through the segment reconciliation they report segments with high abnormal profits and this, 
in turn, attracts greater competition. 
 
Anecdotal evidence also supports the theory that agency costs influence managers’ decisions in disclosing 
or not disclosing segment reconciliations. For example, financial analysts often relate a manager’s financial 
reporting transparency to the level of detailed segment information disclosed. Ben Johnson states, in his analysis of 
Agrium, Inc., “The detailed segment breakdowns and honest performance assessments increase the company’s 
transparency and indicate a shareholder-friendly management team.” Also, in his analysis of the executive team at 
Activision Blizzard, Inc., analyst Norman Young says in his report, “However, we give Activision (management) 
high marks for its clear disclosure of segment information and relevant business trends, as well as having a non-
staggered board of directors.” Other analysts will even take a more direct approach and change their estimate of the 
firm’s discount rate, at least partly, based on the firm’s segment disclosure. For example, Rafael Garcia writes of 
CA, Inc., “While the company’s operations have become more stable, we use an 11% cost of equity to reflect the 
risk of new and planned acquisitions… and limited disclosure of segment data.”4 
 
                                                 
2 Segment reconciliations may also be reported for segment revenues and totals assets. Because of the different classifications of 
reported revenues (e.g., some firms report gross revenues while others report net revenues) and investors’ interest weighing more 
heavily on earnings rather than revenues, we focus on earnings in this study. 
3 At Enron Energy Services (EES), Richard Causey and others concealed massive losses by fraudulently manipulating Enron’s 
“business segment reporting.” At the close of the first quarter of 2001, Enron, with Causey's approval, “reorganized” its business 
segments and moved a large portion of EES’s business into Enron North America (ENA), part of Enron’s wholesale energy 
business segment. The “reorganization” was fraudulently designed to conceal hundreds of millions of dollars of losses at EES, 
Enron’s heavily touted retail energy trading business, which it would otherwise have had to disclose. (SEC v. Richard Causey, 
Civil Action No. H-04-0284) 
4 http://www.morningstar.com/analyst-research/stock-reports.aspx. 
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The theory of segment reconciliations is at an early stage and still requires development of a critical mass 
of research literature. This paper contributes to prior research on segment disclosure in several ways. As one of the 
first studies to examine these segment reconciliations, it is somewhat exploratory in nature. However, it further 
contributes to our understanding of segment disclosure practices by examining a unique setting in which 
management has discretion, based on how the firm is managed internally, to report segment information in a manner 
that may not be consistent with firm-level “GAAP” reported earnings measurements. Additionally, this analysis of 
SERs allows for observation of the effect of mandatory disclosure of segment reconciliations on discretionary 
segment earnings measurement.
5
  
 
This study finds that segment reconciliation differences, when they exist, are significant under the SFAS 
No. 131 segment reporting regime. First, from an overall perspective, the study examines the determinants of firms 
that report SER=0 compared to those that report SER≠0. Our findings show that firms that have a greater number of 
segments, larger firms, and firms with higher leverage, losses, and greater earnings volatility are more likely to 
report SER≠0. However, firms with higher agency costs and greater accruals are less likely to report SER≠0. Our 
finding of higher agency costs being associated with nondisclosure of segment information (SER=0) indicates that 
firms with high agency costs will be more likely to avoid detailed segment disclosure so as to not reveal segments 
with abnormally low profits, cross-subsidization of poorly performing segments from the excess funds of better 
performing segments, or inefficient segment transfers. These results also suggest that firms that have high 
proprietary costs are more likely to report SER≠0, and, thereby, provide a segment reconciliation. This signifies that 
potential entrants could view nondisclosure of segment reconciliations as firms reporting SER=0 in order to avoid 
disclosure and hide segments with abnormally high profits. 
 
We then partition the firms with SER≠0 into two categories (SER<0 and SER>0) in order to examine 
whether the sign of the SER further determines managers’ segment reporting choices for these two types of firms. 
This study finds that SERs are significantly different when comparing SER<0 and SER>0 under the SFAS No. 131 
segment reporting regime. Our empirical findings show that larger firms, and firms with higher leverage and ROA 
are more likely to report aggregated segment-level earnings as less than firm-level earnings (SER>0). Furthermore, 
this study finds that firms with a greater number of segments, greater accruals, greater analyst following, a loss, 
greater aggregated segment earnings, and a Big N auditor are less likely to report SER>0. However, when SER≠0, 
firms with higher agency costs are more likely to report SER>0. Our overall findings suggest that a manager’s 
segment reporting choice is partly driven by agency costs. Hence, this study documents a relation between proxies 
for agency costs and managers’ decisions to report segment reconciliations. Policy implications and suggestions for 
future research are discussed in the paper. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section II provides background on SFAS No. 131 and 
reviews the related literature; Section III discusses the research design and development; Section IV presents the 
sample selection criteria and discusses the empirical findings; and Section V provides a summary and conclusion. 
 
BACKGROUND ON SFAS NO. 131 AND RELATED LITERATURE 
 
Background on SFAS No. 131  
 
SFAS No. 14, Financial Reporting for Segments of a Business Enterprise, introduced by the FASB in 
1976, was criticized for being too vague. In response to the criticism, in June 1997, the FASB introduced SFAS No. 
131, Disclosures about Segments on Enterprise and Related Information, which superseded SFAS No. 14, effective 
for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 1997. This new standard was developed primarily to enable external 
users to view companies through the eyes of management. In effect, SFAS No. 131 requires that companies report 
externally the same information used internally for evaluating segment performance and deciding resource 
allocation to segments, a requirement known as the “management approach.”  
 
SFAS No. 131 requires firms to report segment information based on the way management evaluates the 
operating performance of its business units (operating segments) internally, rather than on the traditional line of 
                                                 
5 It is beyond the scope of this study to disentangle these effects. See Figure 1 for an illustration of the derivation of SERs. 
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business classification (industry segments) previously prescribed under GAAP (SFAS No. 14). Many supporters 
expected that the management approach adopted by SFAS No. 131 would enable outsiders to see an enterprise 
through “insiders’ eyes,” reducing information asymmetry between internal and external users by better aligning 
internal and external financial reporting. As SFAS No. 131 states, “The objective of requiring disclosures about 
segments … is to help users of financial statements: (a) better understand the enterprise’s performance; (b) better 
assess its prospects for future net cash flows; and (c) make more informed judgments about the enterprise as a 
whole.” However, the ambiguity inherent in the standard, with respect to the identification of reportable segments 
and the exact measures of profitability to be presented, led others to question whether the objectives of the standard 
could be reached. The ambiguity inherent in the standard led some to refer to SFAS No. 131 as the “unstandard 
standard” because of the potential lack of consistency, comparability, and reliability of segment-level information 
within firms and across firms (Reason, 2001). 
 
Under SFAS No. 131, the presentation of a firm’s reported segment information must be consistent with a 
firm’s management or organizational approach.6 In determining a measure of profit or loss, SFAS No. 131 specifies 
“The amount of each segment item reported shall be the measure reported to the chief operating decision maker for 
purposes of making decisions about allocating resources to the segment and assessing its performance” (FASB, 
1997). Firms may report a measure of profit or loss for its segments that differs from the measures of earnings 
computed in the consolidated annual report. Therefore, the measures of earnings reported at the segment level may 
or may not be consistent with the measures provided at the firm level (e.g., earnings before interest and taxes, or net 
income). As a result, the whole may not equal the sum of its parts, thereby leading managers to provide segment 
reconciliations (i.e., SERs). Consequently, the segment reconciliations should provide vital information that assists 
the financial statement users to understand any differences between management defined earnings (i.e., management 
approach defined earnings may differ from GAAP) compared to GAAP defined earnings. 
 
Under SFAS No. 131, a company is required to provide a reconciliation of: (1) the total of the reportable 
segments’ profit or loss to the public entity’s consolidated income before income taxes, extraordinary items, and 
discontinued operations (if an entity allocates these items to segments, the entity may reconcile to income or loss 
after these items); (2) the total of the reportable segments’ revenues to the entity’s consolidated revenues; (3) the 
total of the reportable segments’ assets to the entity’s consolidated assets; and (4) the total of the reportable 
segments’ amounts for every other significant item of information disclosed to the corresponding consolidated 
amount. Significant reconciling items should be disclosed separately. 
 
SFAS No. 131 was intended to reduce information asymmetry between internal parties of the firm and 
external users of the firm’s financial reports. However, it may have also led to increased asymmetries and a decline 
in consistency and comparability across firms (Botosan & Stanford, 2005). Moreover, the flexibility provided in 
SFAS No. 131 may lead to reported segment-level performance measures which, in the aggregate, do not equate to 
firm-level performance measures. Appendix B provides an example of the segment reconciliation in Form 10-K of 
Dover Corporation for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2010. Dover Corporation reports four reportable 
segments: Industrial Products, Engineered Systems, Fluid Management, and Electronic Technologies. Dover’s 
segment reporting choices result in reporting SERs<0 because Dover’s aggregated segment-level earnings are higher 
than its firm-level consolidated earnings. Dover also provides a reconciliation of firm-level consolidated earnings 
and the aggregated segment-level earnings in note 14 of its 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2010. As 
shown in Appendix B, the SERs represent the corporate expense, net interest expense, and provisions for taxes. The 
company disaggregates assets.
7
  
 
Segment reporting continues to be a critical element of financial reporting for public companies. The SEC 
staff has continued to emphasize segment disclosures in its review of periodic financial statements (Ernst & Young, 
2009). If the chief operating decision maker receives reports of a component’s operating results on a quarterly or 
more frequent basis, the staff may challenge a registrant’s determination that the component is not a segment for 
                                                 
6 Under SFAS No. 131, operating segments are identified as components of an enterprise about which separate financial 
information is available that is evaluated regularly by the chief operating decision maker in deciding how to allocate resources 
and in assessing performance.  
7 http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/29905/000095012310014502/y81455e10vk.htm#303  
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purposes of SFAS No. 131 unless reports of other overlapping sets of components are more clearly representative of 
the way the business is managed. On a few occasions, the staff has requested copies of all reports furnished to the 
chief operating decision maker if the reported segments did not appear realistic for management’s assessment of a 
company’s performance or conflicted with that officer’s public statements describing the company. The staff also 
has reviewed analysts’ reports, interviews by management with the press, and other public information to evaluate 
consistency with segment disclosures in the financial statements. Where that information revealed different or 
additional segments, amendment of the registrant’s filings to comply with SFAS No. 131 was required.8 
 
As we mentioned previously, segment reporting guidelines under SFAS No. 131 remain under scrutiny. 
James J. Leisenring, a member of the FASB during the issuance of SFAS No. 131, dissented to the guidelines of the 
standard as it relates to measurement of segment profit or loss to be reported (IASCF 2009). Though Leisenring 
supports the management approach of identifying reportable operating segments, he claims that the ambiguity in 
outlining measurements of segment profit or loss may lead to decreased comparability across firms. Subsequently, 
the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) continues to raise concerns about the implementation of SFAS No. 131. 
For example, the SEC continues to encounter cases of inappropriate application of the standard (SEC v. Richard 
Causey, 2004; Bayless, 2001; Turner, 1999) and intends to ensure that segment disclosure requirements are a central 
focus of SEC staff reviews. Hollie et al. (2011) assess various financial reporting frauds that have occurred at the 
segment level, finding that the SEC is concerned with segment disclosure compliance and has pursued violators of 
the standard. The SEC’s concerns with SFAS No. 131, and existing segment reporting practices, suggest that SFAS 
No. 131 may not be as effective as anticipated in reaching its proposed objectives. 
 
This study intends to shed more light on this issue by evaluating the factors for managers’ segment 
reporting choices given that the effectiveness of SFAS No. 131, using segment-to-firm-level earnings 
reconciliations, relates to segment earnings measurements based on managers’ decision making that does not 
necessarily adhere to earnings measurement guidance under GAAP.
 9
 For example, in its 1998 10-K, Caterpillar, 
Inc., explicitly states that its segment reporting, in accordance with SFAS No. 131, has limited usefulness to external 
readers of its financial statements. It discloses traditional GAAP-based financial results for all business lines in its 
MD&A. It does not provide details of the reconciliation between its firm-level and segment-level measurements 
required under SFAS No. 131. In Caterpillar’s 2010 annual report, it continues to state its concern about the 
usefulness of its segment disclosures required under SFAS No. 131. However, it does provide a full reconciliation 
for its segment reconciliation. There are many examples of these inconsistencies and variations in firms’ segment 
reporting under the SFAS No. 131 segment reporting regime. 
 
RELATED LITERATURE 
 
While prior research on SFAS No. 14, which preceded SFAS No. 131, generally finds that segment 
reporting does provide an incremental benefit over aggregated data for the prediction of future earnings (e.g., 
Kinney, 1971; Collins, 1976; Chen & Zhang, 2002). Prior literature related to SFAS No. 131 segment reporting has 
mostly focused on the change in the number of reported segments or the change in the degree of disaggregation 
upon the adoption of SFAS No. 131 (Ettredge et al., 2000; Herrmann & Thomas, 2000; Street et al., 2000), and 
subsequent changes in analyst forecasts (Venkataraman, 2001; Berger & Hann, 2003; Botosan & Stanford, 2005; 
Mande & Ortman, 2002).  However, prior research has not focused on segment reconciliations and, therefore, there 
is limited evidence on managerial decision choices as it relates to the disclosure of the measurement of segment 
earnings under the SFAS No. 131 segment reporting regime.  
 
Several extant studies examine the effect of SFAS No. 131 on financial reporting. The general findings 
suggest, on one hand, that agency costs may drive managers to disclose segment data voluntarily to reduce 
                                                 
8 http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/acctdisc.htm#P261_47756 
9 While segment reporting using the management approach is in accordance with GAAP, how a company chooses to report 
revenue, earnings, expenses, and other financial data at the segment level may differ from the derivation of such components 
under GAAP. For example, a firm may choose to recognize sales at the time a sales agreement is made for segment reporting, 
while GAAP, at the consolidated reporting level, does not allow this. This study’s reference to GAAP or non-GAAP is solely 
based on the derivation of earnings at the segment level. 
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information asymmetries between managers and market participants (Botosan & Stanford, 2005; Piotroski, 1999). 
On the other hand, results of segment reporting studies also suggest that proprietary costs are a major factor in 
segment reporting behavior. These studies find evidence suggesting that managers attempt to protect abnormal 
profits from competitors through the nondisclosure of pertinent segment information (e.g., Hayes & Lundholm, 
1996; Harris, 1998).  
 
In the case of mandated increases in disclosure requirements, Nagarajan and Sridhar’s (1996) model 
indicates that such mandates may induce firms to: (1) reduce the value relevance of their disclosures, and (2) fail to 
disclose some value-relevant information.
10
 Therefore, requiring more mandated disaggregated disclosures could 
increase information asymmetry and actually impede the proposed benefits of increased mandated disclosure. 
Nagarajan and Sridhar’s theoretical finding would be most consistent with managers protecting abnormal profits or 
proprietary information by providing less relevant segment disclosure to fulfill SFAS No. 131 mandates, which is 
more likely when agency problems exists. 
 
Berger and Hann (2007) find that only the agency cost motive leads to the observed segment reporting 
behavior. After examining financial reports, pre- and post-SFAS No. 131, they find that firms with higher agency 
cost exposure tend to aggregate, thereby concealing, the results of less profitable segments in the pre-SFAS No. 131 
period. Specifically, they find evidence that the new segments reported tend to have lower abnormal profits than the 
old segments when the agency cost motive dominates, suggesting that managers used their discretion to hide the 
results of underperforming segments. In contrast, Botosan and Stanford (2005) find that the flexibility of SFAS No. 
14 provides firms with incentives to hide abnormal profits rather than conceal poor performance; that is, more 
disaggregation under SFAS No. 131 reduces these firms’ abnormal profits. According to the theoretical literature 
(e.g., Nagarajan & Sridhar, 1996), this reduction may, in turn, induce firms to reduce the value relevance of their 
segment disclosures, thereby impeding the proposed benefits of SFAS No. 131. Botosan and Stanford (2005) 
suggest that managers may aggregate segment information to protect abnormal profits under SFAS No. 14, 
providing evidence refuting the previously alleged exploitation of SFAS No. 14. Rather than using the flexibility 
under SFAS No. 14 to hide poor performance, they find managers were actually using it to hide abnormal profits. 
 
Hope and Thomas (2008) test the agency cost hypothesis in the context of geographical earnings 
disclosures. They find that geographic segment non-disclosing firms, relative to those that disclosed geographic 
earnings, experience greater agency problems. They also show that when firms do not disclose geographic segment 
information, this reduces the ability of shareholders to monitor managers, which also leads to lower foreign profit 
margins and lower firm value in the post-131 period. Wang et al. (2011) investigate the interplay of managers’ 
motives to conceal versus reveal cross-segment differences in earnings growth in multi-segment firms. Similar to 
those of Hope and Thomas (2008), their findings suggest that managers of firms with greater agency problems tend 
to engage in self-interested behavior such as empire-building. On the other hand, there is evidence that managers are 
no longer using their discretion opportunistically in the post-131 period. Hann and Lu (2009) find a kink in the 
distribution of segment profits and evidence of managers under-allocating overhead costs to inflate segment profits 
only in the pre-131 period and not the post-131 period. They show that an increase in the cost allocation 
transparency as well as an increase in the consistency between external and internal reporting brought about by 
SFAS 131 has led to a reduction in managers' abilities to manipulate segment profits. 
 
A subsequent concurrent study by Ettredge and Wang (2011) also examine the determinants of “Gaps,” 
which is similar to how we have defined SERs. They examine the determinants as well and investigate whether 
aggregated segment earnings are more persistent and informative than corporate earnings when Gaps exist. Their 
results suggest that when Gaps exist, the aggregated segment earnings are modestly more persistent than are 
corporate earnings. This difference appears to be attributable to negative Gaps. When negative Gaps exist, the 
aggregated segment earnings are more informative (in terms of its association with concurrent stock returns) than 
are corporate earnings. When positive Gaps exist, summed segment income has a weaker association with 
concurrent stock returns than corporate earnings. Their findings that negative Gaps are more informative than 
positive Gaps are consistent with our finding that firms with positive SERs are more likely to have higher agency 
costs. Our study differs from Ettredge and Wang (2011) by providing evidence that when SERs exist they are 
                                                 
10 SFAS No. 131 is a mandated disclosure requirement of GAAP. 
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significant and that SERs are value relevant. Second, we use a determinants model that focuses on managers’ 
decisions to report segment reconciliations, and then we further examine the determinants of positive and negative 
SERs. Our study is less concerned with whether, or how, managers aggregate segments than with the net effect of 
managers’ identification and measurement of segment earnings on the financial statements as a whole. This study 
focuses primarily on the deviation of aggregated segment-level earnings from firm-level consolidated earnings. As 
such, it is the first study to investigate the significance and determinants of segment reconciliations. 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN & DEVELOPMENT 
 
Value Relevance 
 
We first determine that segment reconciliations are statistically significant in magnitude, and then determine 
whether SERs should have value relevance. In optimal form, the reconciliation of aggregated segment earnings to 
the consolidated financial statement earnings should quantify and clearly explain each material reconciling item. 
Effects of measurement differences should be identified, and asymmetrical allocations among segments should be 
highlighted. Given this requirement of SFAS No. 131, we expect that SERs will be value relevant. We use the 
following model to assess the value relevance of SERs: 
 
MVE = γ0 + γ1*(|SER|) + γ2*(UE) + γ3*(|SER|* UE) + ε (1) 
 
where:  
 
MVE =  the market value of equity defined as common shares outstanding (Item #25) times end of fiscal year price 
(Item #199). 
|SER| =  the segment reconciliation which is the absolute value of the difference between firm-level operating 
income after depreciation (Item #178) and the sum of segment operating profits (Segment Item OPS).  
UE =  unexpected earnings measured as operating income after depreciation (Item #178) in year t minus operating 
income after depreciation (Item #178) in year t-1.  
 
All variables are scaled by total assets following Brown et al. (1999). 
 
Determinants of Logistic Models 
 
The aim of this study is to identify the determinants of managers reporting a segment reconciliation. Logit 
analysis is used to determine the association of the independent variables with the dichotomous (SER versus non-
SER) segment reconciliation reported by managers as the dependent variable. Segment reconciliation difference 
(SER) is the difference between firm-level earnings, which are reported on the income statement in the annual report 
in year t, and aggregated segment earnings (AGSEG), which is the sum of all segment earnings reported for the firm 
in year t. Figure 1 illustrates the potential differences between aggregated segment-level and firm-level earnings. It 
presents: (1) segments determined by management to be un-reportable according to the thresholds of the relevant 
standard; (2) measures of segment profit or loss that differ from the traditionally accepted measures (i.e., GAAP) of 
profits reported at the firm level; (3) unallocated gains and revenue; and (4) unallocated losses and expenses. 
 
Three possible managers’ segment reporting choices related to the sign of the reconcilable differences are 
possible: (1) when firms report no reconcilable differences – for example, aggregated segment-level earnings equal 
total firm-level earnings, SER=0; (2) when firms report firm-level earnings greater than aggregated segment 
earnings, SER>0; and (3) when firms report firm-level earnings less than aggregated segment earnings, SER<0. 
Firms are required to disclose a detailed segment reconciliation only in instances (2) and (3). This study tests for the 
determinants of managers’ segment reporting choices in two different situations. First, it examines managers’ 
decisions that result in reporting SER=0 or SER≠0. Second, it examines managers’ decisions that result in reporting 
SER>0 and SER<0. Since SERs represent the difference between aggregated segment earnings and firm-level 
consolidated earnings, it seems appropriate to investigate the sign of the difference, that is, positive or negative 
SERs. 
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Figure 1 
Illustration of Segment Reconciliation Reporting Differences 
 
 
Segment 1 
Segment 2 
Firm-Level Earnings                   
(A) 
Segment Reconciliation 
Differences (SERs)                             
(A) – (B) = SER                          
SER = (C) + (D) + (E) + (F) 
Omitted/Unreportable 
Segments                                 
(C) 
Internal Profit/Loss 
Measurement that differs 
from GAAP within                  
SFAS No. 131 GAAP                                         
(D)      
Unallocated Gains &           
Revenue                                             
(E) 
Unallocated Losses & 
Expenses                                       
(F) 
Aggregated  Segment-Level 
Earnings                                       
(B) 
Segment 3 
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This study employs a logistic regression in order to investigate the likelihood that a manager reports SERs by 
evaluating a firm’s decision about whether or not to report aggregated segment-level earnings as different from its 
firm-level earnings. The first logistic model tests the determinants of SER≠0 for the study’s first sample set of 
SER=0 and SER≠0. The second logistic model tests the determinants of SER≠0 for the second sub-set sample of 
SER>0 and SER<0. The independent variables remain the same for both logistic regressions. The study’s empirical 
model is as follows: 
 
SERA = f (AGENCY, ROS, NSEG, ACC, SIZE, LEV, FOL, MB, LOSS, AGSEG,    EARN_VOL, ROA, BIG N, 
HERF) (2) 
 
Agency Costs of Segment Disclosure 
 
Prior literature has shown that agency problems exist in firms when internal capital markets are inefficient 
and when the firm engages in subsidizing poorly performing segments with funds from better performing segments 
(Stulz, 1990; Berger & Ofek, 1995; Lamont, 1997; Shin & Stulz, 1998). For example, Stulz (1990) examines 
managers’ discretion in investment decisions and finds that managers invest too little in projects with positive net 
present value and too much in projects with poor investment prospects. These underinvestment and overinvestment 
costs are caused by the informational asymmetry between managers and shareholders and managers’ inefficient use 
of the free cash flow in the firm. Berger and Ofek (1995) analyze changes in firm value as a result of a firm’s 
diversification strategy. The authors identify a firm’s overinvestment in a segment with limited investment growth 
as one reason for a decline in firm value. A second reason for which they document a loss in value is due to a firm’s 
highly performing segments cross-subsidizing the firm’s low performing segments, a finding that is consistent with 
the evidence in Stulz (1990).  
 
Lamont (1997) studies internal capital markets of multiple segment firms and the capital expenditures of 
these segments in response to a macroeconomic shock. The author finds that segment cross-subsidization leads to 
internal capital markets allocating funds in a suboptimal manner. In a related study, Shin and Stulz (1998) 
investigate whether internal capital markets in firms are beneficial by allocating funds to the divisions that have the 
most profitable projects. The authors conclude that investment by a firm’s segment depends significantly on the cash 
flow and performance of the firm’s other segments, and not necessarily the segment’s own cash flow. These studies 
show that agency problems exist for firms with inefficient capital markets where managers may withhold 
information regarding segments with abnormally low profits. In other words, managers could use their discretion to 
report SER=0, for example, through the subjective allocation of corporate overhead costs, to make aggregated 
segment earnings equal to firm-level income. Managers would then not have to disclose detailed segment 
information in compliance with SFAS No. 131 and can exploit this opportunity by concealing abnormally low 
segment profitability.  
 
Berger and Hann (2007) argue that, when the agency cost motive dominates, managers tend to hide 
abnormally low profitability in disclosing segment information to avoid the attention of external monitors. The 
authors compare restated segment information in the pre- and post-SFAS No. 131 periods to analyze the motives 
under which managers attempt to hide low or high abnormal profits. They find that, in the post-131 period, newly 
reported segments have lower abnormal profit consistent with their agency cost hypothesis. This is because 
managers do not want to expose unresolved agency problems within the firm in order to avoid stricter oversight. 
Withholding the reporting of segments with low profitability may result in SER>0 or SER<0. For example, SER is 
positive when managers select not to disclose the segment with lowest but positive profitability. On the other hand, 
SER is negative when managers select not to disclose the segment with a loss. In both cases, managers hide 
low/high profitability due to agency problems. 
 
In order to test the agency cost hypothesis as a determinant for managers’ segment reporting choices, we 
follow Berger and Hann (2007) for the agency cost sample partition in this study. As a sensitivity check, we also 
construct an alternative agency cost variable following Hope and Thomas (2008), as discussed below. Berger and 
Hann use prior literature to identify two situations under which firms would face an agency cost motive in reporting 
segment information. First, they use a measure to capture whether a firm is subsidizing poorly performing segments 
from the excess funds of better performing segments. If the cross-subsidization is occurring, this is evidence of 
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agency problems. The authors capture the difference between a segment’s capital expenditures and the cash flow the 
segment generates. Second, they assess the decline in value in the firm as a result of the inefficient segment 
transfers. To measure this inefficiency, they compare a segment’s return on sales to the return on sales of the other 
segments in the firm. If the segment’s return on sales is abnormally low, this is also evidence of agency problems at 
the firm. A firm is classified as having an agency cost motive if it has both positive excess capital expenditures (as 
measured in the model below) and has a return on sales that is less than the weighted average of all the segments in 
the firm. 
 
Max [Segment Excess CAPX – Firm-Level Excess CAPX, 0] х 100 
                                   Market Value of Equity 
 
where: 
 
Excess CAPX = max [CAPX – (OPS + DEP), 0]; 
CAPX = capital expenditures; 
OPS = operating profits; 
DEP = depreciation expense. 
 
Again following Berger and Hann (2007) for consistency and comparability, we assume that absent agency 
problems managers would only choose to withhold segment information if proprietary costs existed. Therefore, our 
sample classified as firms with a proprietary cost motive includes all firms not classified as having agency cost 
motives, as described above. Accordingly, our AGENCY variable is defined as 1 if firms are classified as having 
agency cost motives, and 0 otherwise (by design these classified have proprietary cost motives). If firms are using 
SERs to hide unprofitable segments or the cross-subsidization of unprofitable segments, the extent of agency costs 
in the firm can affect a manager’s segment disclosure choice. We expect that firms with higher agency costs are 
more likely to report aggregated segment earnings equal to firm-level earnings.  
 
As an alternative measure of agency costs we follow Hope and Thomas (2008) to ascertain whether our 
results will hold using a variable that captures a different dimension of agency costs. Hope and Thomas find that 
managers tend to avoid disclosure of geographic segment information in order to mask greater expansion of foreign 
sales, lower foreign profit margins, and lower firm value in the post-SFAS No. 131 period. Similar to Hope and 
Thomas, we classify firms as geographic segment disclosers if they report earnings for at least two foreign 
geographic segments in the first two years following the adoption of SFAS No. 131. Since Hope and Thomas find 
that nondisclosers are more likely to have higher agency costs in the post-SFAS No. 131 period, we define our 
alternative agency cost variable as equal to 1 if the firm is classified as a geographic segment discloser, and 0 
otherwise. 
 
Anecdotal evidence also suggests that financial analysts view nondisclosure of segment reconciliations as 
indicative of opaque management and weak corporate governance. For example, analyst Scotts Burns states in his 
report on Air Lease Corporation, “Besides this, the company has released limited data on how Alcan will look going 
forward. Key items such as historical inter-segment sales and future pricing agreements haven’t been disclosed.” 
Rod Bare writes of Garmin, Ltd., “Garmin’s good corporate governance is adequate with conservative accounting 
practices, good segment disclosure, and modest compensation relative to the technology industry.”11  These 
examples suggest that analysts interpret nondisclosure of segment reconciliations (SER=0) with higher agency costs 
due to managers withholding vital information which could assist in properly valuing the firm. 
 
Firms with Losses 
 
In the presence of losses, earnings fail in their traditional role as an indicator of firm value (Hayn, 1995; 
Collins et al., 1997). Additional financial information provided through “management approach” segment disclosure 
is likely to improve estimates of a firm’s value. In addition, since loss firms are more likely to be financially 
distressed, segment information presented through management’s eyes may help market participants assess the 
                                                 
11 http://www.morningstar.com/analyst-research/stock-reports.aspx 
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firm’s viability as a going concern. Accordingly, we expect managers of firms with losses to report earnings at the 
segment level equal to firm-level earnings as a way to avoid detailed disclosure of segment information and 
simultaneously comply with SFAS No. 131 since no disclosure is required. If managers use their discretion 
(management approach) under the SFAS No. 131 segment reporting regime to disguise losses at the segment level, it 
is more likely that such managers would not report segment reconciliations, consistent with Hope and Thomas 
(2008). 
 
Return on Assets 
 
Prior literature suggests that managers attempt to protect abnormal profits from competitors through the 
nondisclosure of segment information (e.g., Hayes & Lundholm, 1996; Harris, 1998). In addition, Berger and Hann 
(2007) find that firms with higher agency cost exposures attempt to aggregate segments in the pre-SFAS No. 131 
period when the segments are less profitable. A higher return on assets makes it more likely that managers have 
certain segments that are relatively less asset intensive and more efficient in terms of producing profits in relation to 
their total amount of debt and equity. When firms are less profitable and more inefficient, we anticipate that 
managers would exhibit more discretion in reporting segment-level earnings equal to firm-level earnings. Therefore, 
managers would not be required to provide a segment reconciliation and could more effectively conceal segments 
with abnormally low profits, also consistent with Hope and Thomas (2008). 
 
Accruals 
 
Accrual-based earnings include managers’ subjective estimates of uncertain future events, and managers 
have incentives to use their reporting discretion opportunistically (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986; Dye & Verrecchia, 
1995; Holthausen et al., 1995). Additionally, Berger and Hann (2007) provide evidence to suggest that managers 
may strategically aggregate segments in order to mask abnormal underperformance. Rather than examine the 
strategic identification of reportable segments here, we examine whether a relationship exists between SERs and 
firm accruals. We expect that managers’ segment reporting behavior is affected by accruals at the firm level. For 
example, underperforming firms may exhibit more positive accruals to mask underperforming segments. 
Furthermore, firms with greater levels of accruals may have more discretion in disaggregating accruals across 
segments, thereby potentially using accruals to report aggregated segment-level earnings equal to firm-level 
earnings in order to avoid detailed disclosure of underperforming segments. 
 
Big N Auditors 
 
Big N auditors
12
 have been shown to be associated with more conservatively reported earnings than non-
Big N auditors (Basu et al., 2001; Reynolds & Francis, 2000; Thomas, 1996; Simunic & Stein, 1996; DeFond 
&Subrahmanyam, 1998). These, and other, studies have shown that the central reason for this tendency toward 
conservatism is mainly attributed to the Big N auditors’ desire to decrease their legal liability exposure and potential 
harm to their reputations (Choi et al., 2008; Francis & Wang, 2004). Litigation exposure has also been found to be a 
stronger driver of audit quality than reputation protection (Khurana & Raman, 2004). Between 1994 and 1997, Big 
N auditors fired approximately 275 high-risk, publicly traded clients in order to improve their reputations 
(MacDonald, 1997). Prior research has also shown that clients of Big N auditors tend to report lower discretionary 
accruals compared to non-Big N clients (Becker et al., 1998; Francis et al., 1999; Krishnan, 2003). Reporting 
aggregated segment-level earnings greater than firm-level earnings might be viewed as being less conservative than 
reporting aggregated segment-level earnings less than, or equal to, firm-level earnings. Additionally, clients with 
lower discretionary accruals can be expected to have less discretion in disaggregating accruals across segments, 
implying that aggregated segment-level earnings will be reported as being less than, or equal to, firm-level earnings. 
 
 
                                                 
12 Chen and Zhou (2007) find that 89% of Andersen clients chose a Big 4 firm as the successor auditor. Please note that this a 
lower bound figure because they exclude 35% of the original sample, which does not contain variables related to corporate 
governance or for firms who switched auditors before October 15, 2001. Therefore, we do not believe that including Andersen 
clients in our sample creates a significant measurement error in the Big N variable. 
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Leverage 
 
Segment information disclosure can be considered an instrument used by firms to reduce the monitoring 
costs for creditors. When firms have high leverage, creditors will urge them to disclose more information so they 
can better handle their own credit risk (Hossain et al., 1994). For example, some studies show that diversified firms 
obtaining long-term capital externally were more likely to disclose segmental financial data voluntarily (Salamon & 
Dhaliwal, 1980). Segment disclosure information is, therefore, of importance to creditors, as it helps them evaluate 
risk correctly. For that reason, we expect a positive link between a firm’s segment reconciliation disclosure and its 
indebtedness. Therefore, firms with high leverage should be more likely to have segment-level earnings that do not 
equal firm-level earnings. 
 
Financial Analyst Following 
 
Prior research shows that managers have incentives to increase the visibility of their firms’ securities 
(Merton, 1987; Fishman & Hagerty, 1989; Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991). If financial analysts influence managers’ 
reporting decisions, then managers should be more inclined to report segment reconciliations so that the firm’s 
segment information is more transparent, this should result in aggregated segment earnings different from firm-level 
earnings. The expectation of SFAS No. 131, of which analysts were the primary proponent, was to increase 
transparency by providing information through insiders’ eyes (i.e., the management approach to segment 
disclosure). If one expects that segment financial information reported under the management approach differs from 
traditional GAAP financial measurements used at the firm level for annual reports, then firms with a high analyst 
following are more likely to report a segment reconciliation in hopes of improving transparency of the firm to 
financial analysts. This potentially implies that providing segment information from a “management approach” 
would generate some differences from the firm-level earnings information that should prove beneficial to financial 
analysts. 
 
Number of Segments Reported 
 
Since segment reconciliations exist only in firms with reportable segments, it is reasonable to consider the 
number of segments in firms as one of the determinants that affect management reporting behavior. Givoly et al. 
(1999) find that the measurement errors in segment information are larger than in those with fewer reportable 
segments. Therefore, the firms with more segments have the capability to report segment-level earnings equal to, 
greater than, or less than firm-level earnings. In such firms, management also possesses a better capability to release 
more “insider” information, because they have more flexibility to do so. Additionally, the number of segments 
provides insights as to firm complexity (e.g., Bhushan, 1989; Berger & Ofek, 1995; Comment & Jarrell, 1995; 
Servaes, 1996; Dunn & Nathan, 1998). Firms with greater complexity may be more inclined to avoid disclosure of 
segment reconciliations, using, among many possibilities, unallocated resources and intercompany transfers, to 
ensure that aggregated segment earnings are equal to firm-level earnings. 
 
Herfindahl Index 
 
The Herfindahl Index (HERF) is used to control for differential levels of industry concentration and 
industry competition (Rhoades, 1993). HERF is measured as the sum of the squares of each firm’s net sales divided 
by the sum of net sales for all firms in its respective industry (Harris, 1998). As competition increases in any 
particular industry, managers may be less inclined to report segment reconciliations to limit incremental information 
from being released to market participants. Therefore, to avoid segment disclosure, these firms would have to use 
their discretion to make aggregated segment earnings equal to firm-level earnings. 
 
Additional Determinant Variables 
 
Additional control variables utilized in this study include: firm size (SIZE), market-to-book (MB), total 
aggregated segment earnings (AGSEG), earnings volatility (EARN_VOL), and the industry-adjusted return on sales 
(ROS). Firm size could influence segment reporting decisions in conflicting ways. SFAS No. 131 requires 
disclosure only if the resulting segment would constitute at least 10 percent of consolidated values. If the size of a 
segment in a given firm is typically below 10 percent of the size of the firm, segment disclosure of the business is 
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less likely. This effect creates a positive association between firm size and the aggregation of line-of-business data. 
However, an opposing (and likely larger) effect is that bigger firms tend to operate in more lines-of-business and, 
therefore, are more likely to report additional segments. Moreover, firm size can be viewed as a proxy for litigation 
risk because larger firms have more assets and are, therefore, more likely to be targets of litigation (Kasznik & Lev, 
1995). This would lead to a negative association between size and the aggregation of different activities, which is 
consistent with prior findings that size is associated with a greater level of disclosure (e.g., Lang & Lundholm, 
1993). Furthermore, larger firms have greater analyst following. As mentioned earlier, analysts equate more detailed 
segment disclosure with increased financial reporting transparency and, therefore, managers who desire to be 
evaluated in a favorable light will tend to disaggregate segment information more. 
 
This study includes market-to-book ratio (MB) to control for growth opportunities and aggregated segment 
earnings (AGSEG) to control for the level of segment earnings disclosure. Since the firms may use segment 
reporting to smooth earnings, this study controls for earnings volatility (EARN_VOL). It is possible that firms with 
high earnings volatility will have strong incentives to report segment-level earnings equal to firm-level earnings in 
order to avoid disclosure of segments with unstable earnings streams. The industry-adjusted return on sales (ROS) is 
included in the model to control for overall industry profitability.  
 
DATA AND EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
Data 
 
The sample selection process begins with Annual Compustat data collected from the Compustat Segment 
and Annual Industrial and Research files for 1999–2006. Firms included in the sample must meet the following 
criteria: (1) firms covered in IBES; (2) firms with no mergers or acquisitions; (3) firms with no missing values, 
across all variables; (4) firms with no missing values for segment earnings in the Compustat Segment database; (5) 
firms not in financial services industries; (6) segments not entitled “Corporate”; (7) segments classified as business 
segments; and (8) firms with no missing CRSP data. Following the industry classification of Fama and French 
(1997), this study deletes industries classified as financial institutions because their required reporting disclosure 
differs significantly from other industries. This sample selection criterion yields a final sample size of 1,202 firms 
and 3,858 firm year observations for 1999–2006. Table 1 provides a summary of the sample selection procedure.  
 
Table 1 
Sample Selection Criteria and Distribution 
Full Sample 
Number of Firm Year 
Observations 
Number of Firms 
   
Compustat Segment reporting 1999-2006 44,448 9,601 
Less: Multiple segment firms 34,348 7,153 
Less: IBES annual earnings forecasts 2,581 608 
Subtotal 7,519 1,840 
   
Less: financial industries 591 169 
Less: mergers and acquisitions 2,088 201 
Less: observations with missing variable values 982 268 
   
Total  (Final Sample 1999-2006) 3,858 1,202 
*This table reports our sample selection procedures. We start with the Compustat Segment reporting file. Firm year observations 
will be excluded if the (latest) analysts’ annual earnings forecast is missing in IBES. We end up with 7,519 firm year 
observations for years 1999 – 2006 (1,840 firms). We next delete financial industries and observations with mergers and 
acquisitions. Finally, we require the observations to have all the financial variables. Our final sample includes 3,858 firm year 
observations for years 1999-2006 (1,202 firms). 
 
Empirical Findings 
 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the sample firms used in this study. Columns to the far right of 
Table 2 present t-statistics for the means of all variables. Firms with SER≠0 and SER=0 are compared in Panel A. 
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All variables in the full sample have significant means except for earnings volatility. When SER=0, all variables 
have significant means expect for firm-level return on sales, market-to-book, and return on assets. For firms with 
SER≠0, all variables have significant means with the exception of earnings volatility. The mean of SER is 
significantly negative for the full sample, which suggests, on average, that firms are more likely to report aggregated 
segment-level earnings greater than the firm-level earnings. Firms with SER=0 are significantly larger and are in 
more competitive industries. Firms with SER≠0 have a significantly greater return on sales, higher leverage, higher 
analyst following, and more growth. 
 
While the tests for the full sample of SER and non-SER disclosers provide initial results, we expect that the 
results should be more apparent for positive versus negative segment reconciliations. In particular, firms with 
SER>0 seem to be missing some earnings items to reconcile aggregated segment earnings to consolidated earnings, 
while firms with SER<0 appear to be overreporting their earnings at the segment level. The overreporting of 
earnings may be an indicator of future earnings in the near future that GAAP does not allow recognition of at that 
time. Because of the possible incentives to report positive or negative SERs, we compare SER<0 to SER>0 in Panel 
B of Table 2.
13
 When SER<0, all of the variables have significant means except for earnings volatility. When 
SER>0, all of the variables have significant means except for firm-level return on sales and unexpected earnings. 
Firms with SER>0 are classified as having an agency cost motive more often, have higher leverage, less accruals, 
are smaller, and are classified as loss firms more often. Consistent with Berger and Hann (2007), the agency cost 
motive finding suggests managers may be hiding abnormal profits. The finding for firms with losses suggests that 
firms could be reporting SER>0 to conceal losses since these firms also have higher agency costs. Firms with 
SER<0 have significantly greater earnings, are larger, have greater analyst following, have greater aggregated 
segment earnings, have higher ROA, and have a Big N auditor more often. Our findings here suggest that firms that 
report their aggregated segment earnings greater than firm-level earnings may be under greater scrutiny since the 
firms are larger, more profitable, and more closely followed by analysts. They are also more likely to be audited by a 
major audit firm.  
 
Table 3 reports the sample distribution by industry (Panel A) and by year (Panel B). As shown in panel A 
of Table 3, the following five industries comprise 30% of the full sample: utilities, machinery, business services, 
chemicals, and telecommunications. In these five industries, 56% of the firms report SER<0. Every industry in our 
sample reports more firms with SER≠0 (e.g. SER<0 or SER>0) compared to SER=0. The Herfindahl Index indicates 
that the five most competitive industries in our sample are: utilities, chemicals, machinery, business services, and 
electronic equipment. Their respective index values are 0.002, 0.004, 0.004, 0.005, and 0.006. It should be noted that 
all five industries report a significantly larger number of firms reporting SER<0. In Panel B of Table 3, firm year 
observations are fairly distributed for the full sample and throughout the sample time frame, showing a slight 
decrease in 2006. From 2002 to 2005, the number of firms reporting SER>0 has been increasing. On the other hand, 
from 2003 to 2006, the number of firms reporting SER<0 has been steadily decreasing. This finding does suggest 
that there is a shift in managers’ segment reporting choices over time, which could be a function of their business or 
the economic conditions, or combination of both. 
 
Table 4 presents Pearson/Spearman correlation coefficients for the variables used in our analysis with 
Pearson coefficients in the upper diagonal and Spearman coefficients in the lower diagonal.
14
 The Pearson 
correlation between EARN and AGSEG is positive and significant (.8853, p-value <.0001), which is expected given 
that EARN is decomposed into the AGSEG and SER components, with AGSEG being the significantly larger 
component of earnings. AGSEG is negative and significantly correlated with firm losses (-.4669, p-value <.0001). 
ROA is positive and significantly correlated with EARN and AGSEG (.8055, .7556), respectively, with p-values 
<.0001. These correlations are expected since ROA is constructed with net income and income before extraordinary 
items, respectively. 
 
                                                 
13 Untabulated results show that firms are consistent in their reporting of SERs as consistently positive or negative and very rarely 
change from positive to negative, or vice versa, from year to year over the period 1999–2006. 
14 Tests of multicollinearity using the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) show that multicollinearity does not pose a problem since 
all VIFs are below 2.9. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics (1999-2006) 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Full Sample, SER=0 and SER≠0 
 
Full Sample 
No. of Observations: 3,858 
SER=0 
No. of Observations: 367 
SER≠0 
No. of Observations: 3,491 
SER=0 minus SER≠0 
Variable Mean Std Dev Median t Value Mean Std Dev Median t Value Mean Std Dev Median t Value Mean Pr>|t| 
AGENCY 0.455 0.498 0.000 56.790 0.480 0.500 0.000 18.360 0.453 0.498 0.000 53.750 0.027 0.688 
EARN 0.071 0.152 0.078 28.850 0.068 0.319 0.091 4.060 0.071 0.122 0.077 34.370 -0.003 0.688 
SER -0.010 0.078 -0.004 -8.330 0.000 0.000 0.000 . -0.012 0.082 -0.007 -8.340 0.012 0.007 
ROS 0.100 1.154 0.045 5.390 0.061 0.966 0.062 1.220 0.104 1.172 0.044 5.250 -0.043 0.007 
NSEG 3.126 1.244 3.000 156.100 2.891 1.083 3.000 51.120 3.150 1.257 3.000 148.090 -0.259 0.329 
ACC -0.060 0.102 -0.049 -36.840 -0.042 0.065 -0.039 -12.380 -0.062 0.104 -0.050 -35.150 0.02 0.500 
SIZE 6.889 1.936 6.871 220.970 6.546 1.910 6.546 65.660 6.925 1.936 6.892 211.350 -0.379 0.000 
LEV 0.218 0.172 0.202 78.800 0.190 0.172 0.157 21.090 0.221 0.172 0.205 76.120 -0.031 0.000 
FOL 8.458 7.884 6.000 66.630 7.981 7.089 6.000 21.570 8.508 7.963 6.000 63.130 -0.527 0.000 
MB 2.855 20.376 1.896 8.700 1.685 21.698 2.023 1.490 2.979 20.231 1.878 8.700 -1.294 0.001 
LOSS 0.111 0.314 0.000 21.910 0.087 0.283 0.000 5.910 0.113 0.317 0.000 21.100 -0.026 0.223 
AGSEG 0.081 0.167 0.087 30.170 0.068 0.319 0.091 4.060 0.082 0.142 0.087 34.380 -0.014 0.247 
EARN_VOL 6.387 249.569 0.700 1.590 1.518 3.133 0.511 9.280 6.898 262.355 0.729 1.550 -5.38 0.132 
ROA 0.012 0.357 0.040 2.050 -0.021 0.967 0.055 -0.430 0.015 0.207 0.039 4.370 -0.036 0.104 
BIG N 0.959 0.198 1.000 300.540 0.946 0.227 1.000 79.690 0.960 0.195 1.000 291.200 -0.014 0.695 
HERF 0.034 0.128 0.001 16.420 0.028 0.126 0.000 4.190 0.035 0.128 0.001 15.900 -0.007 0.061 
UE 0.010 0.081 0.008 6.950 0.013 0.076 0.012 2.910 0.009 0.081 0.007 6.390 0.004 0.081 
AGENCY equals 1 if the firm is classified as having an agency motive, 0 otherwise. EARN is firm level operating income after depreciation scaled by total assets (Item #178 / 
Item#6) in year t. SER is the difference between firm level operating income after depreciation (Item #178) and sum of segment operating profits (Item OPS), scaled by total assets 
in year t. ROS is the Fama French (1997) industry-adjusted return on sales (Item #178/Item #6). NSEG is the number of segments in firms. ACC  is the  firm level accruals which 
is the difference between income before extraordinary items (Item#18) and operating cash flows (Item#308) divided by total assets, measured in the year immediately prior to the 
forecasted year (magnitude of accruals). SIZE is the natural log of market value of equity. LEV is the total debt over total assets (Item #9 / Item #6). FOL is number of analyst 
following in year t. MB is the market to book ratio (Item #199 * Item #25 / Item #60). LOSS equals 1 if firm level operating income (Item #178) is negative, 0 otherwise. AGSEG 
is the aggregated segment operating profits (Item OPS) in year t. EARN_VOL is the earnings volatility, measured as the absolute value of the standard deviation of EPS over last 
5 years (plus current year) scaled by the average EPS over the same period. ROA is net income(loss) over total operating assets [Item #172 / (Item #6-Item#1)]. BIG N equals 1 if 
firm’s auditor is a Big N auditor, 0 otherwise. HERF is the sum of the squares of each firm’s net sales divided by the sum of net sales for all firms in its respective industry. UE is 
(Item#178) in year t minus (Item#178) in year t-1 scaled by (Item#6).  
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Table 2 (cont.) 
Descriptive Statistics (1999-2006) 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for SER<0 and SER>0 
 
SER≠0 
No. of Observations: 3,491 
SER<0 
No. of Observations: 2,402 
SER>0 
No. of Observations: 1,089 
SER<0 minus SER>0 
Variable Mean Std Dev Median t Value Mean Std Dev Median t Value Mean Std Dev Median t Value Mean Pr>|t| 
AGENCY 0.453 0.498 0.000 53.750 0.381 0.486 0.000 38.400 0.612 0.487 1.000 41.470 -0.231 0.004 
EARN 0.071 0.122 0.077 34.370 0.075 0.124 0.080 29.500 0.062 0.116 0.071 17.720 0.013 <.0001 
SER -0.012 0.082 -0.007 -8.340 -0.032 0.070 -0.015 -22.160 0.033 0.087 0.010 12.680 -0.065 <.0001 
ROS 0.104 1.172 0.044 5.250 0.121 0.547 0.043 10.850 0.067 1.934 0.047 1.140 0.054 0.205 
NSEG 3.150 1.257 3.000 148.090 3.137 1.247 3.000 123.360 3.179 1.280 3.000 81.970 -0.042 0.364 
ACC -0.062 0.104 -0.050 -35.150 -0.053 0.092 -0.047 -28.390 -0.082 0.126 -0.057 -21.520 0.029 <.0001 
SIZE 6.925 1.936 6.892 211.350 6.962 1.886 6.892 180.940 6.842 2.041 6.889 110.650 0.12 0.089 
LEV 0.221 0.172 0.205 76.120 0.216 0.167 0.199 63.410 0.233 0.181 0.225 42.340 -0.017 0.010 
FOL 8.508 7.963 6.000 63.130 8.733 8.025 6.000 53.330 8.012 7.803 6.000 33.880 0.721 0.013 
MB 2.979 20.231 1.878 8.700 2.943 18.705 1.926 7.710 3.056 23.256 1.784 4.340 -0.113 0.879 
LOSS 0.113 0.317 0.000 21.100 0.104 0.305 0.000 16.700 0.133 0.340 0.000 12.930 -0.029 0.012 
AGSEG 0.082 0.142 0.087 34.380 0.107 0.123 0.101 42.570 0.029 0.164 0.056 5.820 0.078 <.0001 
EARN_VOL 6.898 262.355 0.729 1.550 8.810 316.237 0.698 1.370 2.682 8.332 0.816 10.620 6.128 0.523 
ROA 0.015 0.207 0.039 4.370 0.030 0.198 0.045 7.430 -0.017 0.222 0.027 -2.560 0.047 <.0001 
BIG N 0.960 0.195 1.000 291.200 0.967 0.179 1.000 263.990 0.947 0.225 1.000 139.070 0.02 0.005 
HERF 0.035 0.128 0.001 15.900 0.036 0.132 0.001 13.220 0.032 0.120 0.000 8.840 0.004 0.475 
UE 0.009 0.081 0.007 6.390 0.013 0.084 0.009 7.230 0.001 0.073 0.003 0.320 0.012 0.081 
AGENCY equals 1 if the firm is classified as having an agency motive, 0 otherwise (by design these classified have proprietary cost motives). EARN is firm level operating 
income after depreciation scaled by total assets (Item #178 / Item#6) in year t. SER is the difference between firm level operating income after depreciation (Item #178) and sum 
of segment operating profits (Item OPS), scaled by total assets in year t. ROS is the Fama French (1997) industry-adjusted return on sales (Item #178/Item #6). NSEG is the 
number of segments in firms. ACC  is the  firm level accruals which is the difference between income before extraordinary items (Item#18) and operating cash flows (Item#308) 
divided by total assets, measured in the year immediately prior to the forecasted year (magnitude of accruals). SIZE is the natural log of market value of equity. LEV is the total 
debt over total assets (Item #9 / Item #6). FOL is number of analyst following in year t. MB is the market to book ratio (Item #199 * Item #25 / Item #60). LOSS equals 1 if firm 
level operating income (Item #178) is negative, 0 otherwise. AGSEG is the aggregated segment operating profits (Item OPS) in year t. EARN_VOL is the earnings volatility, 
measured as the absolute value of the standard deviation of EPS over last 5 years (plus current year) scaled by the average EPS over the same period. ROA is net income(loss) over 
total operating assets [Item #172 / (Item #6-Item#1)]. BIG N equals 1 if firm’s auditor is a Big N auditor, 0 otherwise. HERF is the sum of the squares of each firm’s net sales 
divided by the sum of net sales for all firms in its respective industry. UE is (Item#178) in year t minus (Item#178) in year t-1 scaled by (Item#6).  
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Table 3 
Industry Classifications and Fiscal Year Distributions for Sample Firms 
Panel A: Industry Classifications for Sample Firms 
Industry Name SER=0 % SER>0 % SER<0 % 
Full 
Sample % HERF 
Agriculture 3 1% 3 0% 2 0% 8 0% 0.838 
Food Products 3 1% 47 2% 25 2% 75 2% 0.026 
Candy & Soda 0 0% 6 0% 0 0% 6 0% 1 
Alcoholic Beverages 3 1% 5 0% 5 0% 13 0% 0.448 
Tobacco Products 0 0% 11 0% 2 0% 13 0% 0.524 
Recreational Products 0 0% 26 1% 8 1% 34 1% 0.184 
Entertainment 1 0% 17 1% 9 1% 27 1% 0.127 
Printing & Publishing 4 1% 59 2% 13 1% 76 2% 0.019 
Consumer Goods 6 2% 40 2% 34 3% 80 2% 0.028 
Apparel 18 5% 44 2% 19 2% 81 2% 0.018 
Healthcare 4 1% 23 1% 9 1% 36 1% 0.091 
Medical Equipment 19 5% 48 2% 24 2% 91 2% 0.031 
Pharmaceutical Products 7 2% 47 2% 23 2% 77 2% 0.051 
Chemicals 10 3% 134 6% 68 6% 212 5% 0.004 
Rubber & Plastic Prod. 3 1% 39 2% 13 1% 55 1% 0.05 
Textiles 5 1% 26 1% 12 1% 43 1% 0.072 
Construction Materials 12 3% 103 4% 35 3% 150 4% 0.009 
Construction 3 1% 29 1% 17 2% 49 1% 0.061 
Steel Works 11 3% 102 4% 40 4% 153 4% 0.01 
Fabricated Products 0 0% 6 0% 2 0% 8 0% 0.316 
Machinery 21 6% 135 6% 81 7% 237 6% 0.004 
Electrical Equipment 14 4% 70 3% 21 2% 105 3% 0.035 
Automobiles & Trucks 17 5% 60 2% 50 5% 127 3% 0.019 
Aircraft 2 1% 40 2% 8 1% 50 1% 0.074 
Shipbuilding & Railroad 2 1% 22 1% 3 0% 27 1% 0.129 
Defense 0 0% 10 0% 2 0% 12 0% 0.649 
Precious Metals 0 0% 11 0% 2 0% 13 0% 0.318 
Nonmetallic Mining 3 1% 22 1% 5 0% 30 1% 0.151 
Coal 0 0% 4 0% 5 0% 9 0% 0.546 
Petroleum & Natural Gas 6 2% 145 6% 29 3% 180 5% 0.012 
Utilities 41 11% 127 5% 119 11% 287 7% 0.002 
Telecommunications 12 3% 115 5% 67 6% 194 5% 0.009 
Personal Services 5 1% 34 1% 6 1% 45 1% 0.067 
Business Services 25 7% 137 6% 64 6% 226 6% 0.005 
Computers 8 2% 50 2% 20 2% 78 2% 0.044 
Electronic Equipment 20 5% 122 5% 47 4% 189 5% 0.006 
Measuring & Control 11 3% 44 2% 35 3% 90 2% 0.022 
Business Supplies 12 3% 73 3% 47 4% 132 3% 0.009 
Shipping Containers 4 1% 19 1% 7 1% 30 1% 0.09 
Transportation 14 4% 78 3% 35 3% 127 3% 0.018 
Wholesale 18 5% 125 5% 28 3% 171 4% 0.01 
Retail 17 5% 104 4% 34 3% 155 4% 0.009 
Restaurants, Hotel, Motel 3 1% 40 2% 14 1% 57 1% 0.06 
TOTAL 367 
 
2,402 
 
1,089 
 
3,858 
  
*The table above reports the industry distribution for our final sample (3,858 firm year observations 1999-2006) based on the 
Fama and French (1997) industry classification. Firms with SIC codes between 6000-6411 or 6500-6999 are excluded from our 
sample since those are financial institutions, insurance and real estate. The Herfindahl Index is defined as the sum of the squares 
of each firm’s net sales divided by the sum of net sales for all firms in its respective industry. 
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Table 3 Continued 
Panel B: Fiscal Year Distributions for Sample Firms 
Fiscal Year 
SER=0 
(Frequency) 
SER>0 
(Frequency) 
SER<0 
(Frequency) 
Full Sample 
(Frequency) 
1999 61 265 125 451 
2000 54 283 117 454 
2001 54 253 156 463 
2002 51 300 143 494 
2003 42 313 165 520 
2004 37 341 143 521 
2005 42 345 142 529 
2006 26 302 98 426 
*The table above reports the fiscal year distribution for our final sample (3,858 firm year observations 1999-2006).  
 
Although not the primary focus of this study, we provide a test (Model 1) to determine the market 
significance of SERs. Table 5 provides evidence that SERs are significantly positive, value relevant, and that these 
segment reconciliation differences do matter to the capital markets. These findings support the necessity to 
determine factors that may affect managers segment reporting choices. SER has a significantly positive association 
with the market value of the firm. This suggests that segment reconciliations increase as the market value increases. 
However, the interaction term of SER and UE is significantly negative, which suggests that firm value decreases 
when unexpected earnings are accompanied by a segment reconciliation. These results are consistent with those of 
Hollie and Yu (2010), who find that the market not only prices but also, in some cases, misprices the persistence of 
SERs, especially when SER>0. This study shows later in the paper that these same firms generally have higher 
agency costs than firms with negative SERs. 
 
The study estimates a logistic model (Model 2) to identify the factors for a firm’s decision of whether or 
not managers report aggregated segment-level earnings different from their consolidated firm-level earnings. The 
first model estimates the factors for SER=0 and SER≠0 and is presented in Table 6. The coefficient on AGENCY, 
our variable of interest, is significantly negative, suggesting that firms that have high agency costs are more likely to 
report aggregated segment earnings equal to firm-level earnings and, thereby, do not provide a segment 
reconciliation. This is consistent with our prediction that firms with high agency costs will be more likely to avoid 
detailed segment disclosure so as to not reveal segments with abnormally low profits, cross-subsidization of poorly 
performing segments from the excess funds of better performing segments, or inefficient segment transfers. Since 
Agency has a value of 1 if the firm is classified as having an agency motive, 0 otherwise (by design these are 
classified as having proprietary cost motives, these results also suggest that firms that have high proprietary costs are 
more likely to report SER≠0, and, thereby, provide a segment reconciliation. This is consistent with the findings of 
Darrough and Stoughton (1990), who predict that firms in more competitive industries will follow better disclosure 
policies. Specifically, the authors predict that in industries with low entry costs, potential entrants could interpret 
withholding information as possible future good news about the industry due to expected positive shocks to product 
demand. In the context of segment disclosure, this means that potential entrants could view nondisclosure of 
segment reconciliations as firms reporting SER=0 in order to avoid disclosure and hide segments with abnormally 
high profits. 
 
In Table 6, the coefficients on NSEG, SIZE, LEV, LOSS, and EARN_VOL are significantly positive, 
suggesting that firms with a greater number of reported segments, larger firms, and firms with losses, higher 
leverage, or higher earnings volatility are more likely to report SER≠0. Firms with more segments are more likely to 
have more allocation issues, be more decentralized, and have more imprecise industry definitions (Givoly et al., 
1999), which may provide additional opportunities for reporting differences between “management approach” 
segment earnings reported versus that of consolidated GAAP earnings reported at the firm level. The expected 
negatively significant coefficient on LOSS could be consistent with the notion that firms are using the flexibility 
provided by the management approach under SFAS No. 131 to lessen the impact of losses at the firm level by 
reporting aggregated segments greater than firm earnings. Firms that experience a loss are twice as likely to report 
SER≠0, as are firms that do not report a loss at the firm level. The positive coefficient on leverage is consistent with 
our expectations since segment disclosure information is important to creditors to allow them to evaluate risk 
correctly. Therefore, if firms with high leverage report segment-level earnings that do not equal firm-level earnings, 
they will be required to disclose a segment reconciliation. 
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Table 4 
Pearson/Spearman Correlation Table 
EARN SER AGENCY ROS NSEG ACC SIZE LEV FOL MB LOSS AGSEG EARN_VOL ROA BIG N HERF
0.0554 -0.2403 0.3485 0.0326 0.2626 0.2631 0.0415 0.1322 0.2316 -0.5200 0.8853 -0.0024 0.8055 0.0169 0.0585
0.0006 <.0001 <.0001 0.0427 <.0001 <.0001 0.0099 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.8810 <.0001 0.2939 0.0003
-0.0653 0.1439 0.0177 0.0217 -0.2871 -0.0009 0.0747 0.0078 -0.0067 -0.0148 -0.4153 0.0014 -0.0467 0.0250 0.0125
<.0001 <.0001 0.2721 0.1781 <.0001 0.9534 <.0001 0.6277 0.6756 0.3593 <.0001 0.9287 0.0037 0.1201 0.4386
-0.3326 0.2347 -0.0418 0.2646 -0.1777 -0.0780 0.0012 -0.0165 -0.0108 0.2862 -0.2860 -0.0138 -0.1594 -0.0343 -0.0043
<.0001 <.0001 0.0094 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.9390 0.3059 0.5016 <.0001 <.0001 0.3906 <.0001 0.0334 0.7887
0.4426 0.0228 -0.1183 0.0368 0.0478 0.0811 0.0345 0.0436 0.0696 -0.1260 0.3093 -0.0011 0.3555 -0.0035 0.0125
<.0001 0.1562 <.0001 0.0223 0.0030 <.0001 0.0322 0.0067 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.9478 <.0001 0.8272 0.4375
-0.0317 0.0304 0.2503 -0.0019 0.0509 0.3369 0.0478 0.1164 0.0164 -0.1048 0.0196 0.0111 0.0445 0.0672 0.1481
0.0489 0.0593 <.0001 0.9061 0.0016 <.0001 0.0030 <.0001 0.3089 <.0001 0.2227 0.4901 0.0057 <.0001 <.0001
0.1550 -0.0792 -0.1518 0.0509 0.0255 0.1528 -0.0436 0.0182 0.0164 -0.3100 0.3730 -0.0013 0.3316 -0.0028 0.0091
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0016 0.1136 <.0001 0.0067 0.2584 0.3101 <.0001 <.0001 0.9350 <.0001 0.8617 0.5729
0.3245 0.0279 -0.0904 0.2277 0.3064 0.1024 -0.0482 0.5692 0.0515 -0.3172 0.2401 0.0228 0.1870 0.1853 0.2196
<.0001 0.0837 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0027 <.0001 0.0014 <.0001 <.0001 0.1571 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
-0.0928 0.0679 -0.0186 -0.0791 0.0812 -0.0363 0.0129 -0.0253 0.0405 -0.0916 0.0031 0.0077 0.0049 0.0466 0.0257
<.0001 <.0001 0.2474 <.0001 <.0001 0.0240 0.4241 0.1164 0.0119 <.0001 0.8499 0.6319 0.7601 0.0038 0.1111
0.2233 -0.0017 -0.0606 0.1598 0.1292 0.0576 0.6037 0.0476 0.0189 -0.1071 0.1168 0.0122 0.0860 0.1053 0.0575
<.0001 0.9173 0.0002 <.0001 <.0001 0.0003 <.0001 0.0031 0.2395 <.0001 <.0001 0.4472 <.0001 <.0001 0.0003
0.4161 -0.0602 -0.1033 0.2149 0.0175 0.0753 0.4392 -0.1745 0.2850 -0.0179 0.2141 -0.0002 0.1862 0.0068 0.0149
<.0001 0.0002 <.0001 <.0001 0.2764 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.2652 <.0001 0.9898 <.0001 0.6735 0.3550
-0.5434 -0.0045 0.2862 -0.3064 -0.1165 -0.2086 -0.3042 -0.1233 -0.1455 -0.0874 -0.4669 -0.0047 -0.3604 -0.0730 -0.0622
<.0001 0.7820 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.7718 <.0001 <.0001 0.0001
0.8896 -0.3941 -0.3903 0.3842 -0.0429 0.1690 0.2516 -0.1237 0.1783 0.3870 -0.4783 -0.0029 0.7556 0.0037 0.0475
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0077 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.8587 <.0001 0.8162 0.0032
-0.4065 0.0283 0.1726 -0.1020 -0.0309 -0.1425 -0.2584 0.0864 -0.1533 -0.2262 0.2513 -0.3637 -0.0027 0.0022 0.1223
<.0001 0.0788 <.0001 <.0001 0.0553 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.8694 0.8901 <.0001
0.8212 -0.1417 -0.2985 0.3971 -0.0259 0.3001 0.3390 -0.2692 0.1903 0.4209 -0.4860 0.7816 -0.3954 0.0013 0.0267
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.1082 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.9369 0.0974
0.0240 -0.0205 -0.0343 0.0258 0.0709 0.0081 0.1772 0.0703 0.1280 0.0114 -0.0730 0.0181 -0.0679 0.0152 0.0401
0.1366 0.2041 0.0334 0.1098 <.0001 0.6161 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.4804 <.0001 0.2609 <.0001 0.3456 0.0127
0.1912 0.0142 -0.0940 0.0277 0.2623 0.0466 0.5923 0.0781 0.3386 0.1024 -0.2481 0.1403 -0.1176 0.1339 0.1485
<.0001 0.3784 <.0001 0.0855 <.0001 0.0038 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
SIZE
LEV
EARN
SER
AGENCY
ROS
NSEG
ACC
BIG N
HERF
FOL
MB
LOSS
AGSEG
EARN_VOL
ROA
*This table reports the Pearson correlation in the upper diagonal and Spearman correlation in the lower diagonal. AGENCY equals 1 if the firm is classified as having an agency 
motive, 0 otherwise (by design these classified have proprietary cost motives). EARN is firm level operating income after depreciation scaled by total assets (Item #178 / Item#6) 
in year t. SER is the difference between firm level operating income after depreciation (Item #178) and sum of segment operating profits (Segment Item OPS), scaled by total 
assets in year t. ROS is the Fama French (1997) industry-adjusted return on sales (Item #178/Item #6). NSEG is the number of segments in firms. ACC  is the  firm level accruals 
which is the difference between income before extraordinary items (Item#18) and operating cash flows (Item#308) divided by total assets, measured in the year immediately prior 
to the forecasted year (magnitude of accruals). SIZE is the natural log of market value of equity. LEV is the total debt over total assets (Item #9 / Item #6). FOL is number of 
analyst following in year t. MB is the market to book ratio (Item #199 * Item #25 / Item #60). LOSS equals 1 if firm level operating income (Item #178) is negative, 0 otherwise. 
AGSEG is the aggregated segment operating profits (Segment Item OPS) in year t. EARN_VOL is the earnings volatility, measured as the absolute value of the standard 
deviation of EPS over last 5 years (plus current year) scaled by the average EPS over the same period. ROA is net income (loss) over total operating assets [Annual Data Item 
#172 / (Item #6-Item#1)]. BIG N equals 1 if firm’s auditor is a Big N auditor, 0 otherwise. HERF is the sum of the squares of each firm’s net sales divided by the sum of net sales 
for all firms in its respective industry. 
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Table 5 
Value Relevance of Segment Reconciliation Differences 
MVE = γ0 + γ1*(|SER|) + γ2*(UE) + γ3*(|SER|* UE) + ε 
Variable Parameter Standard t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept 1.0359 0.0190 54.65 <.0001 
|SER| 0.6339 0.2609 2.71 0.0068 
UE 3.7418 0.2342 14.34 <.0001 
|SER|*UE -6.9945 0.9701 -7.21 <.0001 
MVE is the market value of equity defined as common shares outstanding (Item#25) times end of fiscal year price (Item#199). 
SER is the absolute value of the difference between firm level operating income after depreciation (Item #178) and sum of 
segment operating profits (Segment Item OPS). UE is measured as operating income after depreciation (Item #178) in year t 
minus operating income after depreciation (Item #178) in year t-1. All variables are scaled by total assets following Brown et al. 
1999. 
 
Table 6 
Logistic Regression Results for Determinants of Segment 
Reconciliation Differences for SER = 0 and SER ≠ 0 
 
 SERA = β0 + β1*(AGENCY) + β2*(ROS) + β3*(NSEG) + β4*(ACC) + β5*(SIZE) + β6*(LEV) 
+ β7*(FOL) + β8*(MB) + β9*(LOSS) + β10*(AGSEG) + β11*(EARN_VOL) + β12*(ROA) + β13*(BIG N) + β14*(HERF) 
+ ε 
 
Parameter   Estimate Standard Error Odds Ratio Estimate Pr > ChiSq 
INTERCEPT   0.3353   0.3413   0.3259 
AGENCY   -0.3200 *** 0.1239 0.726 0.0098 
ROS   -0.0358   0.0772 0.965 0.6423 
NSEG   0.1851 *** 0.0562 1.203 0.0010 
ACC   -2.5300 *** 0.6997 0.080 0.0003 
SIZE   0.1402 *** 0.0416 1.150 0.0008 
LEV   1.1297 *** 0.3494 3.095 0.0012 
FOL   -0.0133   0.0091 0.987 0.1432 
MB   -0.0003   0.0036 1.000 0.9454 
LOSS   0.8364 *** 0.2412 2.308 0.0005 
AGSEG   0.7808   0.6009 2.183 0.1938 
EARN_VOL   0.0368 ** 0.0175 1.037 0.0350 
ROA   0.1230   0.1888 1.131 0.5147 
BIG N   0.1099   0.2538 1.116 0.6649 
HERF   -0.2357   0.4822 0.790 0.6249 
              
Number of Observations: 3,858   
Likelihood Ratio      80.3922                                     Percent Concordant        63.20 
  
Likelihood-based Pseudo R-square: 0.00206            Max-rescaled R-Square: 0.0442 
 
*, **, *** Significantly different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. Year and Industry dummy variables have 
been included. 
SERA equals 1 if SER≠0 and 0 if SER=0. AGENCY equals 1 if the firm is classified as having an agency motive, 0 otherwise 
(by design these classified have proprietary cost motives). ROS is the Fama French (1997) industry-adjusted return on sales 
(Item #178/Item #6). NSEG is the number of segments in firms. ACC  is the  firm level accruals which is the difference between 
income before extraordinary items (Item#18) and operating cash flows (Item#308) divided by total assets, measured in the year 
immediately prior to the forecasted year (magnitude of accruals). SIZE is the natural log of market value of equity. LEV is the 
total debt over total assets (Item #9 / Item #6). FOL is number of analyst following in year t. MB is the market to book ratio 
(Item #199 * Item #25 / Item #60). LOSS equals 1 if firm level operating income (Item #178) is negative, 0 otherwise. AGSEG 
is the aggregated segment operating profits (Segment Item OPS) in year t. EARN_VOL is the earnings volatility, measured as 
the absolute value of the standard deviation of EPS over last 5 years (plus current year) scaled by the average EPS over the same 
period. ROA is net income (loss) over total operating assets [Annual Data Item #172 / (Item #6-Item#1)]. BIG N equals 1 if 
firm’s auditor is a Big N auditor, 0 otherwise. HERF is the sum of the squares of each firm’s net sales divided by the sum of net 
sales for all firms in its respective industry.  
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The coefficient on ACC is significantly negative, suggesting that firms that have greater total accruals are 
more likely to report aggregated segment earnings equal to firm-level earnings and, therefore, not disclose a segment 
reconciliation. This is consistent with our expectation that firms with greater levels of accruals may have more 
discretion in disaggregating accruals across segments, thereby potentially using accruals to report aggregated 
segment-level earnings equal to firm-level earnings in order to avoid detailed disclosure of underperforming 
segments. 
 
Finally, the coefficients on ROS, FOL, MB, AGSEG, ROA, BIG N, and HERF are all statistically 
insignificant, suggesting that return on sales, analyst following, firm growth, aggregated segment earnings, return on 
assets, Big N auditors, and industry competition do not significantly affect a managers’ decisions to report SERs 
equal to zero or not. Since the Utilities industry makes up a large proportion of all SER groups, we re-estimate 
Model 2 without firms in this industry and the inferences remain the same.  
 
ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS 
 
Alternative Agency Cost Proxy 
 
To further validate whether agency cost is a determinant of managers’ segment reporting decisions, we use 
an alternative measure of agency cost defined in Hope and Thomas (2008). The authors find that managers tend to 
avoid disclosure of geographic segment information in order to mask greater expansion of foreign sales, lower 
foreign profit margins, and lower firm value in the post-SFAS No. 131 period. This measure classifies firms as 
nondisclosers of geographic segment information if the firm does not disclose at least two foreign segments in the 
first two years following the adoption of SFAS No. 131. In untabulated results, we find that inferences do not 
change when we use this alternative measure.  
 
Positive and Negative Segment Reconciliations  
 
As shown in Figure 2, the mean segment-firm reconciliation is significantly larger in magnitude over the 
period 1999–2006 for firms that have a positive reconciliation (SER>0) than for firms that have a negative 
reconciliation (SER<0). Since we later show that firms with higher agency costs are more likely to report SER>0, 
this trend should be of concern to standard setters. However, we do take note of a slight decline in negative and 
positive SERs around the time the Sarbanes Oxley Act was being enacted. We see another notable decline in 2006. 
Figure 3 shows the number of firms choosing to report SER>0 is significantly larger than the number of firms 
reporting SER<0. Since agency costs are higher for firms with SER>0, this could be indicative of managers using 
their discretion in segment reporting in an opportunistic manner. Therefore, the number of firms choosing to report 
SER>0 should again be of concern to standard setters as it indicates that managers could be using the discretion 
allowed under SFAS No. 131 to disclose or not disclose segment reconciliations as well as determine the sign of the 
reconciliation. 
 
To examine with the sign of the SER matters, we estimate the determinants for positive and negative 
segment reconciliations (SER>0 and SER<0).
15
 Interestingly, the results presented in Table 7 suggest that more 
determinants play a role in whether a firm reports a positive or negative SER compared to the number of 
determinants to determine whether a firm reports an SER or not. Our variable of interest, AGENCY, is significantly 
positive, suggesting that firms that have high agency costs are more likely to report aggregated segment earnings 
less than firm-level earnings.
16
 Firms in which the agency cost motive dominates are twice as likely to report SER>0 
as are firms in which the agency cost motive does not dominate. One plausible explanation is that firms with high 
agency costs have reportable segments with abnormally low profits added up to AGSEG that are much less than the 
consolidated firm-level earnings (i.e., SER>0, or sum of segment earnings is less than firm-level earnings). This 
                                                 
15 We exclude SER=0 firms in this in analysis since we are only interested in the determinants when SER exist along with 
whether the SER is positive or negative. 
16 It should be noted that the positive coefficient on AGENCY in Model 2 is not inconsistent with the negative coefficient in 
Model 1. Model 2 compares only those firms with SER>0 to SER<0 while excluding all firms with SER=0. Model 1 compares 
all firms with SER≠0 (which includes SER>0 and SER<0) to all firms with SER=0. 
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would suggest that SFAS No. 131 is effective in requiring firms to reveal the true internal operating performance of 
individual segments, especially when reportable segments have abnormally low profits.  
 
 
Figure 2 
SER is the difference between firm level operating income after depreciation (Item #178) and sum of segment operating profits 
(Item OPS), scaled by total assets in year t. Full sample includes SER=0, SER>0 and SER<0. 
 
 
 
Figure 3 
SER is the difference between firm level operating income after depreciation (Item #178) and sum of segment operating profits 
(Item OPS), scaled by total assets in year t. 
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Table 7 
Logistic Regression Results for Determinants of Segment 
Reconciliation Differences for SER < 0 and SER > 0 
 
SERB = β0 + β1*(AGENCY) + β2*(ROS) + β3*(NSEG) + β4*(ACC) + β5*(SIZE) + β6*(LEV) 
+ β7*(FOL) + β8*(MB) + β9*(LOSS) + β10*(AGSEG) + β11*(EARN_VOL) + β12*(ROA) + β13*(BIG N) + β14*(HRF) 
+ ε 
 
Parameter   Estimate Standard Error Odds Ratio Estimate Pr > ChiSq 
INTERCEPT   -0.2257   0.2595   0.3844 
AGENCY   0.6982 *** 0.0889 2.010 <.0001 
ROS   -0.0284   0.0346 0.972 0.4111 
NSEG   -0.1140 *** 0.0354 0.892 0.0013 
ACC   -2.8636 *** 0.5947 0.057 <.0001 
SIZE   0.1156   0.0289 1.123 <.0001 
LEV   0.5507 ** 0.2426 1.735 0.0232 
FOL   -0.0156 *** 0.0060 0.984 0.0091 
MB   0.0033   0.0025 1.003 0.1881 
LOSS   -1.3441 *** 0.1777 0.261 <.0001 
AGSEG   -11.1658 *** 0.7818 <0.001 <.0001 
EARN_VOL   -0.0013   0.0044 0.999 0.7614 
ROA   3.9562 *** 0.5378 52.257 <.0001 
BIG N   -0.6338 *** 0.2010 0.531 0.0016 
HERF   -0.3602   0.3353 0.698 0.2827 
              
Number of Observations: 3,491   
Likelihood Ratio      532.6293                                      Percent Concordant        74.80 
  
Likelihood-based Pseudo R-square: 0.1415                 Max-rescaled R-Square: 0.1990 
 
*, **, *** Significantly different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. Year and Industry dummy variables have 
been included. 
SERB equals 1 if SER>0 and 0 if SER<0. AGENCY equals 1 if the firm is classified as having an agency motive, 0 otherwise 
(by design these classified have proprietary cost motives). ROS is the Fama French (1997) industry-adjusted return on sales 
(Item #178/Item #6). NSEG is the number of segments in firms. ACC  is the  firm level accruals which is the difference between 
income before extraordinary items (Item#18) and operating cash flows (Item#308) divided by total assets, measured in the year 
immediately prior to the forecasted year (magnitude of accruals). SIZE is the natural log of market value of equity. LEV is the 
total debt over total assets (Item #9 / Item #6). FOL is number of analyst following in year t. MB is the market to book ratio 
(Item #199 * Item #25 / Item #60). LOSS equals 1 if firm level operating income (Item #178) is negative, 0 otherwise. AGSEG 
is the aggregated segment operating profits (Segment Item OPS) in year t. EARN_VOL is the earnings volatility, measured as 
the absolute value of the standard deviation of EPS over last 5 years (plus current year) scaled by the average EPS over the same 
period. ROA is net income (loss) over total operating assets [Annual Data Item #172 / (Item #6-Item#1)]. BIG N equals 1 if 
firm’s auditor is a Big N auditor, 0 otherwise. HERF is the sum of the squares of each firm’s net sales divided by the sum of net 
sales for all firms in its respective industry. 
 
In addition to the determinants shown to be significant in Table 6, we find that firm profitability and 
whether a firm uses a Big N auditor determines to some degree whether a firm will report a positive or negative 
segment reconciliation. As noted in Table 7, the coefficients on SIZE, ROA, and LEV are significantly positive, 
suggesting that larger firms, firms with higher ROA, and firms with higher leverage are more likely to report 
SER>0. For firms reporting SER>0, the manager’s segment reporting choice is more driven by agency costs than 
SER<0 firms. The positive coefficient on ROA, which signifies that firms with greater ROA are more likely to 
report SER>0, suggests that managers may be attempting to protect abnormal profits by not disclosing segment 
earnings information that supersedes earnings reported at the firm level. 
 
The coefficients on NSEG, ACC, FOL, LOSS, AGSEG, and BIG N are negative, suggesting that firms 
with a greater number of segments, greater total accruals, larger analyst following, losses, or greater aggregated 
segment earnings, and firms with a Big N auditor are less likely to report SER>0. The significantly negative 
coefficient on ACC reported in Table 6 suggests that firms are less likely to report SER≠0. However, in an isolated 
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case where the firm does report SER≠0, it is less likely that the firm will report the SER>0, as suggested by the 
negative coefficient on accruals reported in Table 7. The negative relation between analyst following and firms that 
report SER>0 could indicate that these firms have less external oversight from monitors such as analysts, which 
leads to higher agency costs at these firms. The significant coefficient on LOSS signifies firms are less likely to 
report SER>0. One plausible explanation is that managers may use their segment reporting discretion to show future 
firm profitability. In other words, at the segment level, managers might report earnings in the pipeline as revenues 
(or earnings) that cannot be reported in the consolidated annual report in accordance with GAAP generated earnings. 
The significant coefficient on BIG N shows that firms with a Big N auditor are less likely to report SER>0. 
However, the Big N finding is consistent with our agency finding, that firms with higher agency costs are more 
likely to report SER>0 but are less likely to be audited by a Big N firm. The coefficients on ROS, MB, 
EARN_VOL, and HERF are all statistically insignificant. Such results suggest that firm-level return on sales, 
growth, earnings volatility, and industry competitiveness do not significantly affect a manager’s decision to report 
positive or negative SERs.  
 
Given the high cost of consistently changing segment disclosure to a firm, we do not expect that firms 
change their segment reporting strategies often. However, to ensure that there are no systematic differences, we 
partition our sample into “always negative SERs” and “always positive SERs” sub-samples to examine if there are 
systematic differences in segment reconciliations and firm characteristics across these sub-samples. In untabulated 
results, we find that the majority of firms are consistent in their reporting of “always negative SERs” or “always 
positive SERs” and none of our inferences change when imposing this restriction. 
 
We also perform a robustness check with three alternative definitions of firm-level income: EBITDA, pre-
tax income, and net income. The results using EBITDA are consistent with our results. However, the results using 
pre-tax income and net income are not reliable due to the majority of these firms having negative SER under these 
definitions. 
 
Pre-SFAS No. 131 versus Post-SFAS No. 131 
 
While the pre-SFAS No. 131 reporting period is not the focus of this study, in untabulated results, we 
compare our findings of the determinants of managers’ decision to report SER=0, SER≠0, SER>0, and SER<0 in the 
post-SFAS No. 131 reporting regime (1999–2006) to a comparable time period in the pre-SFAS 131 regime (1990–
1997). Regarding the managers’ decision to report SER=0 or SER≠0, we find that the sign and inferences of all the 
determinants remain the same. In the reporting of SER>0 or SER<0, we find that the significance of all the 
determinants remains the same, with the exception of the number of the segments reported (NSEG). Its coefficient 
of 0.2936 has a p-value <0.0001. This finding is not surprising since the primary change from the SFAS No. 14 
reporting regime to the SFAS No. 131 regime is, on average, the number of segments reported. Our empirical 
findings also suggest that the determinants for managers’ segment reporting choices do not significantly differ 
between the two segment reporting regimes. 
 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
This paper investigates determinants of managers’ segment financial reporting choices to report segment 
reconciliations under the SFAS No. 131 segment reporting regime. We first examine whether these differences exist, 
and because they do, we analyze the significance and value relevance of these differences. We then examine the 
determinants of managers’ decisions to report aggregated segment-level earnings equal to or not equal to 
consolidated firm-level earnings. This study finds that segment reconciliation differences, when they exist, are 
significant. Furthermore, our relevance test shows that these segment reconciliations are value relevant. 
 
In addition, our findings show that the agency cost plays an important role in a manager’s decision choice 
for segment disclosure. First, firms that have high agency costs are more likely to report SER=0, indicating they are 
less likely to report segment reconciliations. These results also suggest that firms that have high proprietary costs are 
more likely to report SER≠0, and, thereby, provide a segment reconciliation. This signifies that potential entrants 
could view nondisclosure of segment reconciliations as firms reporting SER=0 in order to avoid disclosure and hide 
segments with abnormally high profits. Secondly, among firms reporting segment reconciliations, we find that, at 
firms reporting SER>0, managers’ segment reporting choice is partly driven by agency costs.  
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Our empirical findings also show that firms are more likely to report aggregated segment-level earnings not 
equal to firm-level earnings when firms are larger, have a greater number of segments, higher leverage, losses, and 
have greater earnings volatility. However, firms with greater accruals are less likely to report non-zero segment 
reconciliations. Larger firms, and firms with higher leverage and higher ROA are more likely to report aggregated 
segment-level earnings than firm-level earnings (i.e., positive segment reconciliations, SER>0). Still, this study 
finds that firms with a greater number of segments, greater accruals,  or larger analyst following, loss firms, firms 
with greater aggregated segment earnings, and firms with a Big N auditor are less likely to report SER>0. This 
suggests that Big N auditors may be less concerned with potential legal liability exposure and reputational harm with 
respect to SERs and that the existence of SERs may not be associated with decreasing conservatism in accounting 
for segment disclosures.  
 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
Consistent with most research, this study has potential limitations. This study attempts to contribute 
towards the development of a body of segment disclosure literature by highlighting determinants, identified by prior 
research, as possibly applicable to firms with segment reconciliations. As with any study of this nature, a potential 
exists for specification error in the regression and for correlated omitted variables. However, despite these caveats, 
this study has the potential to contribute to a greater understanding of management disclosure practices by 
examining a unique setting where management has discretion to report segment information in a manner that may or 
may not be consistent with firm-level consolidated earnings reported by the firm. 
 
Future research opportunities include the development of a segment disclosure index related to segment 
reconciliations. Future research may control for other variables such as CEO compensation, since the CEO is the 
ultimate decision maker with the management approach to segment reporting under the SFAS No. 131 segment 
reporting regime. Comparisons of segment reconciliation determinants for companies following GAAP versus 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) might prove useful. 
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APPENDIX A 
Definition of Variables 
 
AGENCY 1 if the firm is classified as having an agency motive, 0 otherwise (by design these classified have 
proprietary cost motives). A firm is classified as having an agency cost motive if it has both positive excess 
capital expenditures (as measured in the model below) and has a return on sales that is less than the 
weighted average of all the segments in the firm. 
 
Max [Segment Excess CAPX – Firm Level Excess CAPX, 0] х 100 
Market Value of Equity 
where:  
Excess CAPX = max[CAPX – (OPS + DEP), 0]; 
CAPX = capital expenditures (Segment Item CAPX, Firm Item #128) 
OPS = operating profits (Segment Item OPS, Firm Item #178) 
DEP = depreciation expense (Segment Item DP, Firm Item #103) 
AGENCY 
(alternative) 
1 if the firm reports earnings for at least two foreign geographic segments in the first two years following 
the adoption of SFAS 131 (Hope & Thomas 2008). 
EARN Operating income after depreciation scaled by total assets (Item #178 / Item #6). 
SER Segment reconciliation which is the difference between firm level operating income after depreciation (Item 
#178) and sum of segment operating profits (Item OPS), scaled by total assets in year t.  
ROS Fama French (1997) industry-adjusted return on sales (Item #178/Item #6). 
NSEG Number of segments in firms.  
ACC Firm level accruals which is the difference between income before extraordinary items (Item#18) and 
operating cash flows (Item#308) divided by total assets, measured in the year immediately prior to the 
forecasted year. 
SIZE Natural log of market value of equity (Item #199 * Item #25). 
LEV Total debt over total assets (Item #9 / Item #6).  
FOL Number of analyst following in year t. 
MB Market to book ratio (Item #199 * Item #25 / Item #60).  
LOSS 1 if firm level operating income (Item #178) is negative, 0 otherwise.  
AGSEG Aggregated segment operating profits (Item OPS) in year t. 
EARN_VOL Earnings volatility, measured as the absolute value of the standard deviation of EPS over last 5 years (plus 
current year) scaled by the average EPS. 
ROA Net income(loss) over total operating assets [Item #172 / (Item #6-Item #1)]. 
BIG N 1 if firm’s auditor is a Big N auditor, 0 otherwise. 
HERF Sum of the squares of each firm’s net sales divided by the sum of net sales for all firms in its respective 
industry.  
UE Operating income after depreciation in year t minus operating income after depreciation in year t-1 scaled 
by total assets (Item #178 / Item #6). 
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APPENDIX B 
Example of Firm-Segment Reconciliation Differences between Firm-Level and  
Segment-Level Financial Information for Dover Corporation 
 
 
For the Years Ended December 31, 
 
2010 2009 2008 
Earnings from continuing operations — total consolidated (EARN) 707,908 371,894 694,758 
Earnings from continuing operations - Segments (AGSEG) 
   Industrial Products  226,385 139,757 299,740
Engineered Systems  301,906 227,268 278,553 
Fluid Management  388,420 259,269 385,317 
Electronic Technologies  250,428 83,694 193,641 
Total segments (AGSEG) 1,167,139 709,988 1,157,251 
The amount of SER -459,231 -338,094 -462,493 
    Reconciliation 
   Corporate expense/other  135,714 117,995 115,195
Net interest expense  106,341 100,375 96,037 
Provision for taxes  217,176 119,724 251,261 
Total Reconciliation 459,231 338,094 462,493 
    Disaggregated Total Assets at Segment-level 2010 2009 2008
Industrial Products  1,925,495 1,874,242 2,069,743 
Engineered Systems  1,886,100 1,818,750 1,729,331 
Fluid Management  1,405,122 1,267,388 1,231,391 
Electronic Technologies  1,830,833 1,751,826 1,820,173 
Corporate (principally cash and equivalents and marketable securities)  1,448,211 1,053,496 963,494 
Total continuing assets  8,495,761 7,765,702 7,814,132 
Assets from discontinued operations  67,133 116,701 69,106 
Consolidated total Assets 8,562,894 7,882,403 7,883,238 
    Consolidated Total Assets at Firm-level       
Total current assets  3,261,871 2,522,707 2,630,119 
Property, plant and equipment, net  847,189 828,922 872,134 
Goodwill  3,368,033 3,350,217 3,255,566 
Intangible assets, net  907,523 950,748 952,409 
Other assets and deferred charges  111,145 113,108 103,904 
Total continuing assets  8,495,761 7,765,702 7,814,132 
Assets of discontinued operations  67,133 116,701 69,106 
Total assets  8,562,894 7,882,403 7,883,238 
Form 10-K of Dover Corporation for fiscal year ended December 31, 2010. Dover Corporation reports four reportable segments: 
Industrial Products, Engineered Systems, Fluid Management, and Electronic Technologies. Dover also provides a reconciliation 
of firm level consolidated earnings and the aggregated segment-level earnings in note 14 of its 10-K for fiscal year ended 
December 31, 2010.  
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